"Imagine a warm sea breeze passing over you," Dr. Wolcott tells Polly in Ghost River Theatre's Tomorrow's Child. "We'll have that baby in your arms in a jiff."
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1 Every day, we imagine objects that are not available to our immediate senses. Each act of imagination requires interpretation: Polly, you, and I imagine different beaches, breezes, and bodily sensations. The play, based on Ray Bradbury's short story, asks us to imagine an incomprehensible accident: Polly's baby is delivered into a fourth spatial dimension. Human sense organs, tethered to three-dimensional space, struggle to capture the baby. Our minds integrate him into our perceptions by interpreting his presence as a three-dimensional object. Strangely, he appears as a blue, tentacled pyramid. Polly bemoans the impossibility of seeing her baby, Py, "as he really is" from her limited perspective. Likewise, from his own dimension Py sees his parents "in strange shapes." Onstage, no one carries a pyramidal prop. In fact, the performance lacks live actors entirely. Instead, the spectators spend the performance blindfolded, seated on swivel chairs, encircled by ten loudspeakers. A persistent soundscape steers our imaginations: Polly breathes with the regularity of ocean waves, but Py cries with the stochastic tittering of electric currents. They sound inescapably different, and each spectator interprets the reality of that difference individually. As with Py and Polly, the production questions our ability to meaningfully share in any underlying reality "as it really is." In an era of alternative facts, do shows like Tomorrow's Child enshrine an unbridgeable, experiential relativism at the heart of human experience?
To the contrary, Tomorrow's Child explores the function of subjectivity without absconding from a world of facts. In doing so, it demonstrates an approach to reality that resonates with the interpretive lessons of quantum mechanics. Since Donald Trump's presidential campaign, the notion of post-reality has infiltrated popular culture.
2 'Post-reality' refers to the process of contesting evidence by completely rejecting the value of facticity. For example, Kellyanne Conway did not rebut the unpeopled photographs that demonstrate poor attendance at Trump's inauguration. Instead, she famously refuted the value of such evidence entirely by defending "alternative facts" based in subjective feelings. If one feels that the inauguration was well attended, then it was. She renders reality irrelevant. This may seem like a contemporary problem, but quantum theorists faced a similar quandary a century ago. Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg, and others formalized the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics in the 1920s. Their framework makes sense of atomic situations in which Rebekah Enns as a scientist-usher in Ghost River Theatre's production presented at Winnipeg's West End Cultural Centre as part of Theatre Project Manitoba's 2017/2018 season. Photo by Dylan Hewlett, courtesy of Ghost River Theatre different frames of reference offer incompatible pieces of information. The experiential distance between Py and Polly begs for such sense-making. Some commentators opine that this feature of quantum theory heralded postmodernism: In some hands, the new science naturalized uncertainty and dethroned independent reality's primacy (Carlson) . Recent articles, in turn, blame postmodernism for the recent deluge of post-truth discourse. Jeet Heer plumbs the ethos of "America's First Postmodern President" in a New Republic article of the same name, and Kurt Andersen proposes a genealogy from postmodernism to President Trump in his recent Atlantic feature. In a Quartz piece, Parag Khanna forges the connection explicitly: "Want to understand how Trump happened? Study quantum physics." Khanna's blithe comment provokes but needs revision: "Study the interpretations of quantum physics."
Alternative facts and their advocates misinterpret the pragmatics of contemporary science. Yes, we always interpret our surroundings; but the fact of interpretation does not render the fact of reality invalid. Polly interprets Py's state as if it meant that "he hasn't been born yet. We're still waiting for him to show up." Py interprets a swirl of anemic shapes as helpful beings. Both extrapolate from sense data to form a mental picture of the world. Pictures are interpretations: consistent with data but not necessarily implied by them. Atomic phenomena offer even more interpretive space than everyday things. As David Spurrett argues, many postmodernist thinkers spun their philosophy from "unjustifiable interpretation[s] of quantum mechanics" (44). Spurrett sees Jean-François Lyotard's The Postmodern Condition as the primary offender. According to Spurrett, Lyotard makes "a number of arguments concerning … physics" to prove that contemporary physics supports a total "loss of confidence in metanarratives," before concluding that "[scientific] knowledge will circulate … more as a product, or even as a form of currency" (32-34). Generally, Lyotard's prediction rings true. Conway's "alternative facts" are products, which we buy by watching advertisements, engaging on Twitter, and so on. Lyotard errs, however, in thinking quantum theory supports this transition. Atomic phenomena offer interpretive space, but quantum theory relies on a realist epistemology. A bare metanarrative remains in contemporary physics, which Lyotard ignores: Reality, however strange, exists. Quantum theory aims to delimit, define, and restore our ability to describe that reality despite a growing awareness that our access to it can be limited. If we entertain any link between postmodernism and the current political climate, a renewed engagement with quantum mechanics may help renegotiate the tension between subjectivity and facticity.
This article adapts features of early quantum mechanics in that spirit. I explore only one aspect of the Copenhagen interpretation: the principle of complementarity. Complementarity is the idea that atomic objects can manifest features that appear contradictory but can never do so simultaneously. This habit of atomic phenomena means that we must always include the measuring apparatus-the environment that triggered a manifestation-within our description of reality. Complementarity offers an approach to reality that mediates between two domains without reconciliation. In one, we have measurements that are inseparable from their means of production, which I will relate to Tomorrow's Child's possible readings. In the other, we have potentiality: reality "as it really is," inaccessible to any single measurement. The principle of complementarity holds the simultaneous validity of multiple pictures without descending into anything-goes truthiness.
Complementarity says we must make do with incompatible pictures of a single object. Reconciliation is impossible, but the unreconciled pictures never dissolve into contradiction. Consider the case of particle-wave complementarity. If you shoot a beam of electrons at a wall with two slits, the beam generates an interference pattern on the other side. This is how waves behave: If an ocean wave travels through two gates, it diffracts into two smaller waves that crash into-interfere with-one another. However, if you measure which slit the electron beam passes through, the interference pattern disappears. Instead, you have impact points on the other side, as if the electrons were bullets. This is how particles behave. This oversimplification reveals a fraying concern: Electrons seem to be waves under certain conditions and particles under others. By classical definition, an object cannot be matter (particle) and the transfer of energy through some medium (wave). We seem to have two contradictory pictures of the electron. The principle of complementarity ameliorates-or exacerbates-this apparent contradiction. Bohr explains:
[the experimental data] implies the impossibility of any sharp separation between the behaviour of atomic objects and the interaction with the measuring instruments, which serve to define the conditions under which the phenomena appear….
[E]vidence obtained under different experimental conditions cannot be comprehended within a single picture, but must be regarded as complementary in the sense that only the totality of the phenomena exhausts the possible information about the objects. (39) (40) The two results contradict one another only if we force them into a single picture. However, no machine could both measure and not measure the transit of electrons. The two pictures represent different experimental conditions. If we include the measuring instrument within each picture, they represent different things. In more familiar terms, complementarity requires the scientist to place the experiment's frame within the picture of reality the experiment offers: The apparatus that frames the electron-or a performance-cannot be sharply distinguished from the object.
In Tomorrow's Child, Ghost River Theatre links perspective to measurement and our desire to know reality "as it really is." Twenty lines into the play, a nurse checks the delivery room's "moral climate monitor." The delightful gag demonstrates how everything is measurable, interpretable, and subject to framing. Py's birth scene swiftly follows. A harsh cacophony of distorted noise descends abruptly into the strained cries, which then transition into uncomfortable electronic squelches. Eric Rose and Mathew Waddell's soundscape shifts between distinct, incompatible perspectives on the moment of birth. Perhaps the churning noises are the result of the birth machine crunching numbers, moral climate A renewed engagement with quantum mechanics may help renegotiate the tension between subjectivity and facticity. ctr 175 summer 2018 "Nature Exposed to Our Line of Questioning": Tomorrow's Child as Quantum Theatre | FEATURES included. The muffled heartbeat and cries seem to be Py's experience of himself as a natural being; Dr. Wolcott hears Py's cries as distorted, four-dimensional squeals. In the next scene, expert voices embody these imbricated perspectives: Dr. Wolcott frames Py as an unpredictable accident; the scientist frames Py as an object in an extended "subspace"; the social worker frames Py as "a differently abled child"; the nurse frames Py as a developing child; the geometrist frames Py as a "special case of the triangular pyramid." At a glance, the descriptions are contradictory. Can one object be an "n-gonal pyramid," a normal child, "a differently abled child," and an anomalous subspace? Instead, we can treat these pictures of Py as complementary measurements of Py's reality. As Bohr cautions, we cannot make "any sharp separation" between an object and its interaction with the measuring instrument. The geometrist's mathematical formula and the nurse's baby formula are tools with which they engage an aspect of Py. In turn, a picture of Py is projected through that tool. Py's very name slyly plays the same game: a pyramid, a mathematical constant π, and a mother's loving pet name. Py, "as he really is," requires the totality of possible frames. However, we cannot approach Py with every frame at the same moment any more than we can simultaneously approach the electron's wave-like and particle-like properties. We are left with complementary pictures, indicating his underlying reality.
The audience is complicit in this process. We interpret Py through our senses. However, the play deprives us of the theatre's primary sensing apparatus: the visual image. With the material image gone, we are forced to measure the play's reality as a sound wave. The rebalancing of sensual apparatuses foregrounds how much imaginative work enters our sensual engagement with the world. Rose and Waddell's soundscape rebukes straightforward comprehension: Muffled heartbeats, whirling blades, buzzing electrons, and modem-like grinding coalesce into cacophony. Heisenberg laments that our experiments only return "black spots on a photographic plate" or "water droplets in a cloud chamber," however much we want to discuss the atom (153). In atomic physics, as in everyday life, we perceive reality through a measuring apparatus, but the black spot on the photographic plate is as much a feature of the photographic plate as the electron. Tomorrow's Child's unique materiality emphasizes this unavoidable conundrum. Each loudspeaker plays different audio. Dialogue and noise erupt from different directions, overlap, cross, or whirl around the space. Seated in swivel chairs, we confront our roles as spectator-scientists. We choose where to turn, where to strain our ears, and which sounds to follow. In other words, the audience is made aware of their own measuring apparatus. Where the story emphasizes the limit of perspectives, the production forces us to Ghost River Theatre's Artistic Director Eric Rose as a scientist-usher (also co-adapter/director/sound designer) leads blindfolded audience members to their seats in the Winnipeg production. Photo by Dylan Hewlett, courtesy of Ghost River Theatre overcome the loss of our primary measuring device from a position within an experimental situation.
Here, subjectivity sneaks into both quantum theory and Tomorrow's Child. As Heisenberg pronounces, "what we observe is not nature in itself but nature exposed to our method of questioning" (32, emphasis added). That 'our' cracks the door to subjectivity ajar. The scientist chooses which variables the experimental situation will measure (called 'observables'). That choice determines which possible picture of reality will be projected. Heisenberg explains:
Quantum theory does not contain genuine subjective features … but it starts from the division of the world into the 'object' and the rest of the world.… This division is arbitrary and historically a direct consequence of our scientific method…. But this is already a reference to ourselves and in so far our description is not completely objective. (29) (30) Choice does not create reality, but it does determine which possible outcomes persist and which perish. The probability function of an atomic event-its mathematical description-offers "a whole ensemble of possible events," and the "transition from the 
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'possible' to the 'actual' takes place during the act of observation" (28). That probability function can be solved in nearly infinite ways, but those solutions are not unbounded: The mathematical function sets firm limits, within which all possible routes are contained. Subjectivity does not create reality or open the door to wild post-truthiness: Rather, it permits subjective projections of reality, but each such projection must nonetheless participate in the "completely objective" limits described by the mathematical function. There are infinite possibilities, but that does not mean everything is possible. Tomorrow's Child makes salient the quantum choice. The audience is positioned in the physical centre of the performance. From moment to moment, each spectator excises an object of cognition from the whole soundscape, by focusing on an audio track. Ghost River Theatre complicates matters by placing two loudspeakers overhead. When Py's father visits his baby, an electric hum overhead represents the infant's warming lamp. As scientistspectators, we are the centre of the event; however, we share that centre with the strange object of every character's investigation. The traditional spectator watches his or her object from a position without. Instead, Tomorrow's Child inextricably ties our subject position to Py's experience as an object of scrutiny. The shared centrality suggests that our subjectivity and the subjectivity of the characters are continuous with the objectivity of the fictional world and the material presence of loudspeakers and sound waves. In short, we share a world with Py as we share his experience of bewildering, extra-dimensional sense data. When the performance ends, we remove our blindfolds and see the blue pyramid. The inscrutable reality shares our space. That shared world does not contain "genuine subjective features," but our choices within it project complementary pictures. Each interpretation, however, must participate in the play's material facts. The audio data are a part of the production "as it really is," but we access these data through our individual perspectives.
How do we bridge the gap between our complementary pictures and reality "as it really is," under the Copenhagen interpretation's rubric? According to Heisenberg, the probability function of atomic events is "a quantitative version of the old concept of 'potentia' in Aristotelian philosophy … a strange kind of reality just in the middle between possibility and reality" (15). In other words, potentia-described mathematically-is a fundamental reality within which all complementary pictures participate. To get the "right impression of the strange kind of reality behind our atomic experiments," we must flip between many complementary pictures and imagine the unpresentable potentia. As Bohr says above, to describe the "totality" of any phenomena-objects and events "as they really are"-we must exhaust every possible picture. Given the structure of the human mind, our sense organs, and the dictates of time's arrow, we can never actually exhaust every picture. There remains a fundamental distance between reality and our perspective, but we find an increasingly accurate impression of reality by adopting complementary perspectives. How else could we describe performance? We look stage left and are left with a fuzzy image of stage right. The totality of the stage lingers only as an impression. As Peggy Phelan argues, performance "becomes itself through disappearance" (146). In theory, that ephemeral presence of performance itself could be described, but only an impression lingers in practice. Our senses make capturing the entire performance impossible. But that performance still exists as a field of potential, possible readings, and interpretations.
As artists and scholars, we embrace multiplicity every day. As Jenn Stephenson notes, multiplicity helps us confront oppression, rattle illegitimate narratives, construct spaces for the excluded, and adopt a more open attitude. However, multiplicity's shadow flickers beneath the "who cares" anti-facticity embraced by reactionary politicians. If the world is interpretation, how do we refute the claim that, say, climate change is a hoax perpetrated by the Chinese government? Must we accept flagrant misrepresentation as the unfortunate corollary to multiplicity? Quantum mechanics offers an alternative. Quantum events are indeterminate, but they inhere within a definable possibility function, a limited potentia. Tomorrow's Child offers a field of potential that is unusually analyzable: recorded, reproducible, precisely arranged. Yet we still come to complementary pictures. Furthermore, the play indicates the fragility of each picture and encourages us to glimpse the strange reality beneath. We glimpse Py's four-dimensionality, and there we see our limits. Py's reality is amenable to our readings, but not boundless. Like an electron, there are interpretations the production cannot bear. Likewise, it is impossible to read climate change as a Chinese hoax within the boundary conditions of scientific data. Such a claim is not an alternative fact; it is an illegitimate picture that fails the test of complementarity. Quantum mechanics supports multiplicity without losing facticity. As Heisenberg and Bohr both say, "when searching for harmony in life one must never forget that in the drama of existence we are ourselves both players and spectators" (Heisenberg 32) . Contemporary theatre, too, reminds us of this important lesson. There remains a fundamental distance between reality and our perspective, but we find an increasingly accurate impression of reality by adopting complementary perspectives.
